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ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAW 
IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: 
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN 
THE PROSECUTION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL HEDGE FUND 
FRAUD 
Junsun Park* 
INTRODUCTION: THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUND FRAUD 
Over the last few decades, the global hedge fund industry has 
grown at a surprising rate.1 In 2007, more than 10,000 hedge 
funds ran their business in the global marketplaces, and they 
collectively managed US$2.150 trillion.2 Although the hedge 
fund industry declined in 2008 due to the financial crisis, its 
recovery is well in progress now.3 Indeed, the number of hedge 
funds in operation in 2010 reached 9500, and their total assets 
under management were US$1.920 trillion.4 
As the hedge fund industry has expanded, securities law vio-
lations by hedge fund managers have also increased.5 Such se-
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 1. George Sami, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regu-
lation in the United States and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 275 
(2009). 
 2. MARKO MASLAKOVIC, THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Hedge-funds-2011.pdf. 
 3. See id. at 1. 
 4. Id. at 1–2. 
 5. Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Per-
spective, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 555–56 (2008); see also Paul M. Jonna, Com-
ment, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge Fund Reg-
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curities law violations can significantly impair the integrity of 
the market and threaten the confidence of investors. In recent 
years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“U.S. 
SEC” or “SEC”) has filed a number of enforcement actions 
against hedge funds and their managers.6 For example, in 2009 
the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (“U.S. DOJ” or 
“DOJ”) initiated their enforcement proceedings against Raj Ra-
jaratnam, a hedge fund manager, for insider trading.7 As one of 
the biggest insider trading rings on record,8 his fraud produced 
millions of dollars in illegal benefits.9 Moreover, Rajaratnam’s 
scheme affected securities from various major companies, in-
cluding Google, Hilton, and Intel to name a few.10 In light of 
these negative effects, securities regulators have called for 
strict enforcement for hedge fund fraud.11 
Despite the need for strict enforcement, securities regulators 
often face difficulties in combating hedge fund fraud. Hedge 
funds can make fraudulent schemes more difficult to detect due 
                                                                                                                                     
ulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1008 (2008); see also SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 72–75 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter 2003 SEC 
STAFF REPORT]. 
 6. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555–56. 
 7. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt. LP, 274 F.R.D. 120 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09 Civ. 8811) (JSR) (Oct. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21255.pdf; see also Com-
plaint at 1, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 MAG 2306 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 
2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/hedgefund/rajaratnamrajetalcomplaint.pdf. 
 8. Azam Ahmed & Guibert Gates, The Galleon Network, N.Y. TIMES (May 
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/08/business/galleon-
graphic.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S.D.N.Y., Hedge Fund 
Billionaire Raj Rajaratnam Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court of In-
sider Trading Charges 1 (May 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May11/rajaratnamrajverdictpr.
pdf; SEC v. Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); United 
States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 9. Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty 
Against Raj Rajaratnam (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm. 
 10. Litigation Release No. 21284, SEC, SEC Charges 13 Additional Indi-
viduals and Entities in Galleon Insider Trading Case (Nov. 5, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21284.htm. 
 11. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 72–75; see also Thomsen 
et al., supra note 5, at 555. 
2014] TRANSNAT'L HEDGE FUND FRAUD 233 
to the complexity of the fund structures and operations.12 In-
deed, as the hedge fund industry has expanded beyond borders, 
securities fraud involving hedge funds has also become trans-
national. 13  For instance, even if hedge fund managers are 
working in the United States or United Kingdom (“U.K.”), the 
hedge funds themselves are often located in tax havens of less-
regulated countries.14 Furthermore, certain managers operate 
both domestic and offshore funds at the same time.15 
In order to respond to the global expansion of securities 
fraud, including hedge fund fraud, domestic securities regula-
tors must act transnationally. 16  With no single regulatory 
scheme to govern all global markets, each country has sought 
to apply its domestic laws extraterritorially to combat transna-
tional securities fraud; 17 however, in order to enforce domestic 
securities laws that reach extraterritorially, regulators need to 
secure assistance from foreign authorities.18 Because enforce-
ment of law is limited within a territory, domestic regulators 
cannot generally use their enforcement power within the terri-
                                                                                                                                     
 12. See Thomas C. Pearson, When Hedge Funds Betray a Creditor Commit-
tee’s Fiduciary Role: New Twist on Insider Trading in the International Fi-
nancial Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 165, 175–76 (2008). 
 13. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs: The Year in Review, 41 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) No. 519 (Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Goldsmith-Ahn-Boone-
HedgeFundsInTheCrosshairs.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Funds in the Cross-
hairs]. 
 14. See Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Finan-
cial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge 
Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 26–27 & n.145 (2007) (quoting FIN. 
SERVS. AUTH., HEDGE FUNDS AND THE FSA: FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON DP16, 6 
(2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs16.pdf); see also 
2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; see also FRANÇOIS-SERGE 
LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 87–88 (2006). 
 15. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 108–11 (explaining mirror structures 
and master-feeder structures). 
 16. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities 
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Sub-
ject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 90 (2003). 
 17. See id. at 90–91. 
 18. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW 
§ 11:53 (2012); see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, 58 ENFORCEMENT REP. 6, 7 
(2008), available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/public/enforcement/08/may_08.pdf. 
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tory of other countries.19 The regulators, therefore, have to ob-
tain cooperation from other countries, particularly when they 
enforce their own laws against fraud involving cross-border 
transactions.20 
Recognizing the territorial limits on enforcement power, 
many jurisdictions provide a legislative framework for author-
izing domestic securities regulators to assist foreign authori-
ties.21 Based on these pieces of legislation, securities regulators 
entered into international networks to execute cross-border as-
sistance. 22  Popular networks for international securities en-
forcement include Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) and 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”).23 Since 1982, the 
SEC has signed a number of bilateral MOUs with different for-
eign authorities.24 Since 2002, the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) also has promoted a mul-
tilateral MOU (“IOSCO MMOU” or “MMOU”),25 listing ninety-
seven authorities as full signatories.26 In addition to the MOUs, 
the United States currently has a number of MLATs with vari-
                                                                                                                                     
 19. INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 9–10 (2009), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839-
A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E. 
 20. HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:53; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, supra 
note 18, at 7. 
 21. Felice B. Friedman et al., Taking Stock of Information Sharing in Se-
curities Enforcement Matters, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 37, 40–41 (2002); see also 
HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:54. 
 22. Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 41. 
 23. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, SEC, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 
SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT 3–4 (2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/intercoop.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012). 
 24. Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2012). 
 25. International Enforcement Assistance, SEC OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml (last visited Sept. 
10, 2011) [hereinafter SEC International Enforcement Assistance]. 
 26. IOSCO MMOU: Current Signatories - 97, IOSCO, 
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Nov. 
12, 2013) [hereinafter Current Signatories]. Currently, twenty-three authori-
ties “have committed to seeking the legal authority necessary to enable them 
to become full signatories to the IOSCO MMOU.” Id. 
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ous foreign countries.27 Despite these efforts, current network 
mechanisms promoting cooperation have not been effective in 
combatting multinational hedge fund fraud. In particular, alt-
hough many securities regulators across the world have sought 
to cooperate through international networks, defects in the 
network mechanisms themselves and a lack of domestic legal 
authority impede effective cooperation among regulators. 
In seeking how to overcome these obstacles, this article will 
explore ways that promote international cooperation in detect-
ing, investigating, and prosecuting cross-border hedge fund 
fraud. In particular, it will describe the trends toward globali-
zation of hedge fund fraud. Next, it will discuss how to enforce 
national securities laws cooperatively by using international 
network mechanisms. Finally, this study will provide recom-
mendations for reforming the international securities enforce-
ment system, thereby achieving more effective cooperation in 
combatting hedge fund fraud. 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS REGARDING 
HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR MANAGERS 
A. Overview 
Securities fraud schemes employed by hedge fund managers 
are not unique to the hedge fund context.28 Most commonly, 
securities violations committed by hedge fund professionals fall 
into traditional fraud categories; however,29 hedge fund man-
agers are more easily enticed to employ fraudulent schemes 
                                                                                                                                     
 27. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.3.6.3 (2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf; see 
also Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (entered into force on Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter U.S.-
Switz. MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-14 [hereinafter U.S.-
Can. MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, 1994 U.S.T. 205 (1995) (entered into force on 
Dec. 2, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. MLAT]; see also Agreement on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-H.K., Apr. 15, 1997, 1997 U.S.T. 
115 (1997) (entered into force on Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-H.K. 
MLAT]; see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
U.S.-S. Korea, Nov. 23, 1993, 1993 U.S.T. 135 (1995) (entered into force on 
May 23, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-S. Korea MLAT]. 
 28. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73. 
 29. See id. at 73–74; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555. 
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because they have the motive and ability to do so.30 For exam-
ple, they routinely handle a large amount of money,31 employ 
high risk investment strategies,32 are compensated based on 
their performance,33 operate funds largely at their discretion,34 
have close connections with other financial entities,35 and have 
a favorable environment to engage in misrepresentation.36 Pos-
sible violations may include misappropriation of funds, insider 
trading, and market manipulation.37 
Hedge funds tend to make fraudulent schemes more difficult 
to detect due to the complexity of the fund structures and oper-
ations.38 Most importantly, as the hedge fund industry has ex-
panded beyond national borders, securities fraud involving 
hedge funds has also become transnational.39 For example, alt-
hough many hedge fund managers work in the United States 
or U.K., the hedge funds themselves are often located outside 
these countries in order to maximize the tax benefits and lower 
regulatory compliance costs.40 Furthermore, certain managers 
operate both domestic and offshore funds at the same time.41 
Such multinational hedge funds are generally set up as a mir-
ror structure or a master-feeder structure.42 In the course of 
the operation, the multinational fund managers conduct for-
                                                                                                                                     
 30. See Richard Strohmenger, Note, Insider Trading and Hedge Funds: A 
Dangerous Pair, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 523, 532–34 (2010). 
 31. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73. 
 32. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
 33. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558; see also WULF ALEXANDER KAAL, 
HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION – A COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 24 (2006). 
 34. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73; see also Thomsen et 
al., supra note 5, at 557, 567; DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF 
HEDGE FUNDS 273 (2005). 
 35. Pearson, supra note 12, at 175. 
 36. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558–59. 
 37. See id. at 542. 
 38. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76. 
 39. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs, supra note 13. 
 40. See Pearson & Pearson, supra note 14, at 26–27 & n.145 (quoting FIN. 
SERVS. AUTH., supra note 14, at 6); see also 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 10; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 14, at 6; see also 
LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 87–88. 
 41. LHABITANT, supra note14, at 108–11 (explaining mirror structures and 
master-feeder structures). 
 42. See id. 
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eign or cross-border transactions.43 Furthermore, hedge fund 
managers often use Internet communication and networking to 
expand their businesses worldwide.44 
Given the circumstances, securities fraud committed by 
hedge fund managers has become largely transnational.45 The 
trend toward the internationalization of hedge fund frauds has 
become particularly evident in enforcement actions targeting 
misappropriation, insider trading, and market manipulation. 
B. Misappropriation and Hedge Funds 
Misappropriation of funds entails “the application of anoth-
er’s property or money dishonestly to one’s own use.”46 Motives 
to misappropriate hedge funds may vary among managers. 
Some may manage the funds in a legitimate manner at the be-
ginning of their operation, deciding later to employ a fraudu-
lent scheme when encountering financial difficulty.47 Others, 
however, may create a hedge fund entity solely for the purpose 
of misusing investors’ money for their own sake. 
If so inclined, hedge fund managers are able to commit mis-
appropriation because they operate with a large amount of 
money in day-to-day investment.48 Furthermore, managers can 
avoid investors’ surveillance simply by misrepresenting the 
profitability of the funds.49 Investors may not suspect misap-
propriation if the fund looks profitable on paper.50 For this rea-
son, when managers misappropriate hedge fund assets, they 
                                                                                                                                     
 43. See id. at 109–10 (explaining the transfer of funds). 
 44. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, 8, 45–51, SEC v. Ficeto, CV–11–1637 GHK 
(RZx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21865.pdf [hereinafter 
Ficeto Complaint] (addressing the Internet communication between Colin 
Heatherington, a Canadian resident, and Tony Ahn, an American resident). 
 45. See Hedge Funds in the Crosshairs, supra note 13. 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1088 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S.D.N.Y., Chief Executive 
Officer of Bayou Funds Sentenced to 20 Years in Federal Prison for Massive 
Investor Fraud (Apr.14, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April08/israelsamuelsentencep
r.pdf; see also Nick S. Dhesi, Note, The Conman and the Sheriff: SEC Juris-
diction and the Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Modern Securities 
Fraud, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1360 (2010). 
 48. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73. 
 49. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 558–59; see also 2003 SEC STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 74. 
 50. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 559. 
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usually then misrepresent fund operations to conceal the evi-
dence.51 To that end, the managers may fabricate the fund’s 
appearance by using false documentation.52 The misrepresen-
tation enables the managers to disguise their violations and to 
deceive investors into remaining in the fund.53 
A typical misappropriation involving hedge funds may be-
come more complicated with hedge funds that are globally or-
ganized and thereby involve foreign or cross-border transac-
tions.54 For example, in a master-feeder structure, investors 
put their money into a domestic or offshore feeder fund, and 
the feeder funds then reinvest the money in a master fund.55 
Conversely, in redemption of shares, a master fund pays a do-
mestic or offshore feeder fund for shares, and the feeder funds 
then repay individual investors.56 
Regardless of whether hedge funds are globally organized, 
their managers may transfer money to foreign bank accounts 
after misappropriation.57 This transaction can be designed to 
facilitate other fraudulent schemes, including money launder-
ing.58 In particular, the money laundering scheme enables the 
managers to conceal the source of the money and use it for 
their own purpose, avoiding regulatory nets.59 
C. Insider Trading and Hedge Funds 
Unlawful insider trading involves “buying or selling a securi-
ty, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust 
and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic in-
formation about the security.”60 In recent years, many insider 
                                                                                                                                     
 51. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; see also Thomsen et al., 
supra note 5, at 560, 567. 
 52. 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; see also Thomsen et al., 
supra note 5, at 560, 567. 
 53. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 559. 
 54. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 109–10. 
 55. Id. at 109. 
 56. Id. at 109–10. 
 57. See, e.g., Information at 12–15, United States v. Madoff, 09 CRIM 213 
(Mar. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090310criminalinfo.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., id. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 13–15. 
 60. Insider Trading, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
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trading cases have involved hedge funds and their managers.61 
The SEC also has considered “hedge fund insider trading as a 
top priority”62 for its enforcement program.63 This results from 
concerns that high-risk investment strategies and perfor-
mance-based compensation of hedge funds may entice manag-
ers to devise insider trading schemes.64 Also, in day-to-day op-
erations, hedge funds develop close relationships with corpo-
rate clients and investment bankers who possess material non-
public information. 65  This operational environment enables 
hedge fund managers to obtain inside information.66 
One major concern involves the investment strategies em-
ployed by hedge fund managers.67 These strategies usually con-
tain various high-risk techniques.68 In order to reduce the in-
vestment risks, hedge fund managers may seek to obtain in-
formation regarding financial events. In some instances, the 
managers may trade on material information that is available 
to them, but not yet disclosed to the public.69 For example, a 
hedge fund manager employing an event-driven strategy might 
make transactions based on nonpublic information regarding 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: 
CASE AND MATERIALS 467 (3rd ed. 2012); see, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-28.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam with Insider Trad-
ing (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm; Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Managers and Traders in $30 Mil-
lion Expert Network Insider Trading Scheme (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-40.htm. 
 62. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading 
Ring, supra note 61. 
 63. Id.; see also Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 577 (citing Examining 
Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congr. (2006) (testimony of Lin-
da Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts120506lct.pdf). 
 64. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
 65. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 
578–81; Pearson, supra note 12, at 175. 
 66. Pearson, supra note 12, at 173–77. 
 67. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
 68. Id.; Pearson & Pearson, supra note 14, at 19–20. 
 69. See Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
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corporate “bankruptcies, reorganizations, and mergers.”70 In-
deed, hedge funds that function as lenders or substantial inves-
tors in a corporation may receive information in their capacity 
that has not been shared with the general public.71 
Another concern is that performance-based compensation of 
hedge funds can also induce managers to commit illegal insider 
trading.72 Because performance is closely related to compensa-
tion in hedge funds, managers might trade on inside infor-
mation in order to increase their personal income.73 In addi-
tion, high water marks and hurdle rates designed to limit per-
formance fees might pressure managers enough to consider in-
sider trading.74 Under the provision of high water marks, each 
term fund managers have to achieve a better profit than the 
previous one in order to receive a performance fee.75 Under the 
provision of hurdle rates, they must make more profits than 
the “minimum investment performance.” 76  In these circum-
stances, managers are pressured to perform, which could lead 
them to commit insider trading.77 
A final concern is that the operational environments of hedge 
funds enable the managers to obtain confidential information 
from investors or brokerage firms.78 Hedge fund investors not 
only have the ability to commit insider trading, but also the 
motivation.79 Some investors work as officials in other corpora-
tions, frequently dealing with corporate inside information.80 
Such investors might deliver corporate information to their 
fund managers,81 aiming to benefit the funds that they invest 
                                                                                                                                     
 70. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, 
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 3 (Apr. 1999); Thom-
sen et al., supra note 5, at 578. 
 71. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 578–79; see also Strohmenger, supra 
note 30, at 533. 
 72. Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 62–63. 
 75. Id. at 62. 
 76. Id. at 63. 
 77. See Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 533. 
 78. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 
578–81; Pearson, supra note 12, at 175. 
 79. See Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 578–79. 
 80. See id. at 578. 
 81. Id. 
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in. In light of their access and motives, hedge fund investors as 
corporate officials have great potential for insider trading.82 
Outside entities assisting hedge funds also have the capacity 
and motive to be involved in insider trading.83 In particular, a 
number of investment banks provide prime brokerage services 
to hedge funds.84 While working with “public companies, mutu-
al funds, and other hedge funds,”85 investment banks usually 
handle nonpublic information. 86  Furthermore, many seek to 
maintain hedge fund clients because hedge funds trade regu-
larly and frequently, which enables the banks to collect large 
amounts of service fees.87 Thus, in order to maintain good rela-
tionships with hedge fund clients, investment bankers might 
transfer nonpublic information to those clients.88 
In light of such risks, it is not surprising that the SEC has 
recently initiated a number of enforcement proceedings against 
hedge fund managers for insider trading.89 Regulators, howev-
er, may face difficulties when investigating insider trading dur-
ing the enforcement process. These complications typically 
arise because of the international aspects of hedge fund opera-
tions. For example, a hedge fund manager can globally organ-
ize hedge fund entities,90 employ overseas transactions,91 trans-
fer money across borders,92 invest in foreign securities,93 and 
work with foreign persons or entities.94 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. See id. 
 83. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 467; see also Thomsen et al., supra 
note 5, at 580. 
 84. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 580. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see also Strohmenger, supra note 30, at 534. 
 89. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 555. 
 90. Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76; see, e.g., Complaint at 5–6, SEC v. 
Lyon, 605 F.Supp.2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19942.pdf [hereinafter 
Lyon Complaint]. 
 91. See LHABITANT, supra note 14, at 109–10. 
 92. Complaint at 40, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt. LP, 683 F.Supp.2d 316 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 8811), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21397.pdf. 
 93. See. e.g., id. at 11, 40 (describing the investment in a Canadian com-
pany’s stock). 
 94. See. e.g., id. at 39; Lyon Complaint, supra note 90, at 10. 
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D. Market Manipulation and Hedge Funds 
Market manipulation refers to “intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artifi-
cially affecting the price of securities.”95 Typical manipulative 
conduct might involve circulating false information and using 
deceptive trading practices.96 Such manipulative schemes are 
often attractive to hedge fund managers because they can falsi-
fy their performance by maneuvering markets in their favor.97 
Because performance is directly related to compensation, man-
agers are enticed to trade manipulatively in order to increase 
their income.98 
In addition, hedge fund managers have the ability to manipu-
late markets due to their strategic trading activities,99 as well 
as due to the large amount of fund money at their discretionary 
use.100 This operational environment enables managers to ex-
ploit fund investment for their manipulative trading.101 For ex-
ample, a hedge fund manager may invest the fund in stock, us-
ing various trading techniques in order to maneuver the price 
of the stock.102 Then, he directs the fund to buy the stock at the 
raised price.103 Finally, the manager can fabricate his perfor-
mance based on the manipulative transactions.104 
Similar to the situations in misappropriation and insider 
trading, a typical manipulation case may become more compli-
cated with hedge funds that are globally managed.105 Many 
hedge fund managers in the course of day-to-day business in-
vest funds in foreign markets and, in doing so, frequently 
                                                                                                                                     
 95. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also NAGY 
ET AL., supra note 61, at 615. 
 96. See Manipulation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tmanipul.htm 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see also NAGY ET AL., supra note 61, at 615–16. 
 97. Thomsen et al., supra note 5, at 617. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 174, 176. 
 100. See 2003 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 73; see also HAMMER ET 
AL., supra note 34, 273. 
 101. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Securities Professionals 
and Traders in International Hedge Fund Portfolio Pumping Scheme (Feb. 
24, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-51.htm. 
 102. See, e.g., id. 
 103. See, e.g., Ficeto Complaint, supra note 44, at 4. 
 104. See, e.g., id. 
 105. See Pearson, supra note 12, at 175–76 (discussing difficulties in enforc-
ing insider trading regulation). 
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communicate with overseas professionals,106 making their ac-
tivities difficult to detect and prosecute. A more serious concern 
is that some managers violating securities laws may intention-
ally make their schemes transnational in order to avoid regula-
tory detection. 
II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATING AND 
PROSECUTING SECURITIES FRAUD 
A. Domestic Legislation Enabling Enforcement Cooperation 
In order to respond to the global expansion of securities 
fraud, including hedge fund fraud, domestic securities regula-
tors must act transnationally.107 With no single regulation to 
govern all global markets, each country has sought to apply its 
domestic laws extraterritorially to combat transnational securi-
ties fraud.108 In the United States, the SEC and the DOJ can 
currently apply the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws 
to certain overseas transactions.109 The U.S. Supreme Court 
discarded the effects and conduct tests in Morrison,110 yet Con-
gress, immediately after this decision, enacted a provision in 
the Dodd-Frank Act re-authorizing the SEC and the DOJ to 
use these two tests.111 Although national securities laws extend 
extraterritorially, the ability to gather facts and evidence of a 
violation, and the ability to prosecute that violation, is not 
guaranteed.112 Because enforcement of law is limited within a 
territory, domestic regulators generally cannot use their en-
                                                                                                                                     
 106. See, e.g., Ficeto Complaint, supra note 44, at 4–5, 8, 45–51 (addressing 
the Internet communication between a trader in Canada and a trader in the 
United States). 
 107. See Chang, supra note 16, at 90. 
 108. See id. at 90–91. 
 109. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 (2010) [hereinafter 
Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 110. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2879–88 (2010); see 
also Letter from Hannah L. Buxbaum, Ind. Univ., Maurer Sch. of Law, Com-
ments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Release No. 34-
63174, File No. 4-617, 1 (Feb. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-14.pdf. 
 111. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b); see also HICKS, supra note 18, § 11:50. 
 112. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 19, at 9–10; see also Sec. & Futures 
Comm’n, supra note 18, at 6, 7. 
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forcement power within the territory of other countries. 113 
Thus, securities regulators should cooperate with each other to 
successfully enforce national securities laws.114 
For this reason, many countries have established provisions 
authorizing their securities regulators to provide cross-border 
assistance. For example, the United States has Section 21(a)(2) 
of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”);115 Switzerland 
has Article 38 of the Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Secu-
rities Trading (“Stock Exchange Act”)116 and Article 42 of the 
Federal Act on the Financial Market Supervision Act (“Finan-
cial Market Supervision Act”);117 Canada has Sections 11(1)(b), 
126, 143.10(1), and 153 of the Ontario Securities Act;118 the 
U.K. has Sections 169 and 354 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000;119 Hong Kong has Section 186 of the Secu-
rities and Futures Ordinance;120 and South Korea has Article 
437 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets 
Act (“Financial Investment Act”). 121  These provisions enable 
domestic securities regulators to obtain evidence located 
abroad, thereby overcoming the obstacles to enforcing laws 
                                                                                                                                     
 113. INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 114. See HICKS, supra note 18, §11:53; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, su-
pra note 18, at 7. 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2006). 
 116. Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading (Stock Ex-
change Act, SESTA) of March 24, 1995, art. 38 (Jan. 1, 2009) (Switz.), availa-
ble at http://www.six-exchange-
regulation.com/download/admission/regulation/federal_acts/sesta_en.pdf (un-
official translation). 
 117. Federal Act on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial 
Market Supervision Act, FINMASA) of 22 June 2007 (2009), art. 42 (July 1, 
2013) (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/9/956.1.en.pdf. 
 118. Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, §§ 11(1)(b), 126(1)(b), 143.10(1), 153 
(Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm. 
 119. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 169, 354 (U.K.), 
available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf. 
 120. Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571, § 186 (H.K.), 
available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E003
3E532/5167961DDC96C3B7482575EF001C7C2D/$FILE/CAP_571_e_b5.pdf. 
 121. FINANCIAL INVESTMENT SERVICES AND CAPITAL MARKETS ACT art. 437 (S. 
Kor.), available at 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/lr/list03.jsp?menu=0203&bbsid=BBS0087 (last visit-
ed Oct. 17, 2013). 
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against transnational securities fraud.122 With no single regu-
lator to govern the global financial market,123 securities regula-
tors can most effectively combat globalized securities fraud by 
cooperating with one another.124 
B. International Networks for Enforcement Cooperation 
The aforementioned legislation enables securities regulators 
to assist foreign counterparts in enforcing domestic laws.125 The 
execution of this assistance allows for certain arrangements 
among nations.126 Although ad hoc arrangements can be used 
by regulators in a particular case, prearranged international 
networks are more common.127 Popular networks for interna-
tional securities enforcement include MOUs, particularly those 
that are bilateral and multilateral, and MLATs.128 MOUs are 
nonbinding arrangements allowing regulators to share infor-
mation and to provide assistance to their foreign counter-
parts. 129  Because of their flexibility, MOUs are increasingly 
considered key tools for transnational cooperation among secu-
rities regulators.130 By contrast, MLATs are less flexible be-
cause establishing MLATs involves complicated procedures, 
such as diplomatic negotiation and legislative ratification.131 As 
treaties, MLATs are legally binding agreements and typically 
                                                                                                                                     
 122. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 41. 
 123. See Chang, supra note 16, at 90. 
 124. See SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25. 
 125. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 40 (stating that the legislation 
enables securities regulators to share information freely with their foreign 
counterparts). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25. 
 128. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
 129. Elliott M. Beard, A Critical Analysis of the Effects Of Colello v. SEC on 
International Securities Law Enforcement Agreements, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 271, 274 (1996). 
 130. See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in 
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 885, 894 (2009); see also Di-
nah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 
75 (David Armstrong ed., 2009) (describing the increasing importance of “soft 
law,” which includes “any written international instrument, other than a 
treaty, containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of ex-
pected behavior”). 
 131. See Caroline A.A. Greene, International Securities Law Enforcement: 
Recent Advances in Assistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
635, 649 (1994). 
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require regulators to provide assistance to each other in crimi-
nal matters.132 In recent years, countries have relied largely on 
such international networks to promote cooperation in securi-
ties enforcement.133 
1. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) 
a. Bilateral MOUs 
i. Overview 
MOUs refer to “regulator-to-regulator arrangements regard-
ing information sharing and cooperation in securities mat-
ters.”134 These arrangements are memorialized in nonbinding 
agreements.135 Since 1982, the SEC has signed bilateral MOUs 
on enforcement cooperation with a number of authorities from 
different jurisdictions, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Ja-
pan, Jersey, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K.136 The United States 
concluded MOUs with Switzerland in 1982137 and 1987,138 Can-
ada in 1988,139 the U.K. in 1991,140 and Hong Kong in 1995.141 
                                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 640; see also Charles R. Mills et al., International Enforcement: 
Enforcement Actions in the Global Market, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 489, 498–99 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 
1997). 
 133. Although countries can use the Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention or Con-
vention), this mechanism suffers a number of problems all its own. Greene, 
supra note 131, at 639–40 (listing the limitations of using the Hague Conven-
tion); Beard, supra note 129, at 272. 
 134. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3. 
 135. Beard, supra note 129, at 274. 
 136. SEC International Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25; SEC, Coop-
erative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 24. 
 137. Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 31, 1982, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/switzerland.pdf [herein-
after 1982 U.S.-Switz. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Government of 
Switzerland). As the first MOU for global enforcement cooperation, the 1982 
MOU signed by the United States with Switzerland is historically important. 
Each part of this MOU demonstrates how difficult enforcement cooperation 
was in the early stage. The United States has modeled other MOUs on this 
first MOU with some revision. MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIME § 4:45 
(11th ed. 2012). Given these circumstances, analyzing the 1982 MOU be-
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tween the United States and Switzerland can be useful to understanding oth-
er MOUs’ contents and to finding ways of overcoming their problems. This 
chapter, therefore, includes analysis of the 1982 MOU, even though “[t]his 
MOU has now been replaced by [the 1987 MOU].” David Chaikin, The Impact 
of Swiss Principles of Mutual Assistance on Financial and Fiscal Crimes, 16 
REVENUE L.J. 192, 196 n.13 (2006), available at 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1173&context=rlj
&sei-
re-
dir=1#search=%221982%20MEMORANDUM%20UNDERSTANDING%20GO
VERNMENT%20SWITZERLAND%22. 
 138. Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters and Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, U.S.-Switz., Nov. 10, 
1987, 27 I.L.M. 480 (1988), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20693205.pdf?acceptTC=true (Memoran-
dum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Switzerland). In addition to the 1982 and 
1987 MOUs, on November 3, 1993, the United States exchanged diplomatic 
notes with Switzerland. Letter from Warren Christopher, Sec’y of State, U.S., 
to Carlo Jagmetti, Ambassador of Switz., at 1 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@internationalaffairs/documents/file/ss
c93.pdf [hereinafter 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes]. This has expanded the range of 
assistance that the SEC could obtain under the 1987 MOU; in particular, the 
SEC has been able to “use information obtained in Switzerland as evidence in 
civil and administrative proceedings involving a wide array of securities-
related offenses.” Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the United States 
and Switzerland, SEC NEWS DIGEST 1, 2 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1993/dig110393.pdf [hereinafter SEC NEWS 
DIGEST]; see also 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes, supra, at 1–2 (Letter from Warren 
Christopher, Sec’y of State, U.S., to Carlo Jagmetti, Ambassador of Switzer-
land). 
 139. Memorandum of Understanding on Administration and Enforcement 
of Securities Laws, U.S.-Can., Jan. 7, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 412, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/canada.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Can. 
MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Ontario Securities Commission, the 
Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec, and the British Columbia 
Securities Commission). 
 140. Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance and the Ex-
change of Information, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 25, 1991, International Series Re-
lease No. 323, 1991 SEC LEXIS 1997, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/ukingdom_enfcoop.pdf [hereinaf-
ter U.S.-U.K. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry 
and Securities and Investments Board). As the second MOU between the 
United States and the U.K., this agreement has replaced the previous 1986 
MOU. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information, U.S.-
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ii. Scope of Assistance  
Whether a domestic regulator can successfully prosecute an 
international fraud case depends largely on the assistance that 
can be obtained from foreign authorities.142 If foreign authori-
ties can provide assistance by leveraging their own domestic 
power, a domestic regulator can prosecute international fraud 
as effectively as a local case.143 On the other hand, if foreign 
authorities so requested are restricted from using their power 
fully, a domestic regulator may be unable to obtain crucial 
pieces of evidence.144 
Given the crucial importance of substantial transnational as-
sistance, most MOUs, including those signed by the United 
States with Switzerland, Canada, the U.K., and Hong Kong, 
define the scope of assistance.145 Under the 1982 MOU between 
                                                                                                                                     
U.K., Sept. 23, 1986, International Series Release No. 4, 1986 SEC LEXIS 
2308, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/ukingdom_enfcoop.pdf (Memo-
randum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry of the United 
Kingdom); see also MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A 
CONTEMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 221 (1999). 
 141. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooper-
ation and Enforcement of Securities Law and Declaration on Cooperation and 
Supervision of Cross-Border Investment Management Act, U.S.-H.K., Oct. 5, 
1995, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2810, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/hongkong.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-
H.K. MOU] (Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and the Hong Kong Securities and Fu-
tures Commission). 
 142. ANA CARVAJAL & JENNIFER ELLIOTT, INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE 
CHALLENGE OF ENFORCEMENT IN SECURITIES MARKETS: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 22 
(2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09168.pdf; see also SEC In-
ternational Enforcement Assistance, supra note 25. 
 143. See Technical Comm., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Principles for Memo-
randa of Understanding § 7 (1991), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD17.pdf. 
 144. See id.; see also Sec. & Futures Comm’n, supra note 18, at 7. 
 145. See 1982 U.S.-Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. III, para. 1; Agreement 
XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association with Regard to the Handling of Re-
quests for Information from the SEC on the Subject of Misuse of Insider In-
formation, arts. 4, 9, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Agree-
ment XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association]; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 
139, art. 2; U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II, para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU, 
supra note 141, para. 3.1. 
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the United States and Switzerland, the Swiss Bankers’ Associ-
ation was able to provide information to the SEC, bypassing 
Swiss bank secrecy laws.146 If certain conditions were met, as-
set freezing assistance was also available under this MOU.147 
This assistance was limited to insider trading investigations; 
thus it was not available for most securities law violations.148 
Nevertheless, since the exchange of diplomatic notes between 
the United States and Switzerland in 1993, this narrow scope 
of assistance has been expanded to include various securities 
law violations.149 
The MOUs signed by the United States with Canada, the 
U.K., and Hong Kong recognize a broad range of assistance in 
gathering evidence.150 In particular, these agreements call for 
“the fullest mutual assistance,” 151  requiring that authorities 
assist each other in (1) “providing . . . information in the files of 
the requested [a]uthority,”152 (2) “taking the evidence of per-
sons,”153 and (3) “obtaining documents from persons.”154 Such 
assistance is governed by “the laws of the jurisdiction of the 
requested [a]uthority.”155 The scope of assistance agreed upon 
by these three countries is reflected in the IOSCO MMOU.156 
                                                                                                                                     
 146. 1982 U.S.–Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. III, para. 1; Agreement 
XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association, supra note 145, art. 4. 
 147. Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association, supra note 145, art. 
9, para. 1. 
 148. 1982 U.S.–Switz. MOU, supra note 137, pt. I, para. 1, pt. III, para. 2. 
 149. SEC NEWS DIGEST, supra note 138, at 2; 1993 U.S.-Switz. Notes, supra 
note 138, at 1 (Letter from Warren Christopher, Sec’y of State, to Carlo Jag-
metti, Ambassador of Switzerland). 
 150. See U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2; U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 
140, pt. II, para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141, para. 3.1. 
 151. U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2, para. 1; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra 
note 141, para. 3.1.1. The MOU between the U.S. and the U.K. also has a 
similar provision. See U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II, para. 6. 
 152. U.S.-Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 2, para. 2(a). 
 153. Id. art. 2, para. 2(b). 
 154. Id. art. 2, para. 2(c). MOUs signed by the U.S. with the U.K. and Hong 
Kong also have similar provisions. See U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. II, 
para. 6; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141, para. 3.1.2. 
 155. U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140, pt. IV, para. 13(a). MOUs signed by 
the U.S. with Canada and Hong Kong also have similar provisions. See U.S.-
Can. MOU, supra note 139, art. 5, para. 3; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141, 
para. 3.4.3. 
 156. Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Multilateral Memorandum of Understand-
ing Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Infor-
mation art. 7(b), May 2002, available at 
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Such a broad range of assistance in information sharing is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to establish an effective interna-
tional enforcement mechanism.157 In particular, assistance in 
freezing assets is also indispensable to combatting internation-
al securities fraud, for if wrongdoers can enjoy the proceeds of 
their fraudulent activities even after they are detected, the de-
terrent function of securities laws is decreased.158 In light of the 
importance of freezing assets, it is problematic that the MOUs 
signed by the United States with Canada, the U.K., and Hong 
Kong do not explicitly provide for assistance in this regard.159 
b. International Organization of Securities Commissions Multi-
lateral MOU (IOSCO MMOU) 
i. Overview 
IOSCO was established in 1983 to promote regulatory coop-
eration in global securities markets. 160  It started with only 
eleven members—all of them North and South American secu-
rities regulators. 161  Later, from 1984 onward, non-American 
regulators also began to enter IOSCO.162 Accordingly, with the 
constant expansion of its membership, it has admitted securi-
ties regulators from more than one hundred countries, involv-
ing over 95% of global securities markets.163 IOSCO now func-
tions as a primary governmental cluster to promote interna-
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf [hereinafter 
IOSCO MMOU] (rev. May 2012). 
 157. See Michael D. Mann et al., The Establishment of International Mech-
anisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from 
Securities Law Violations, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 304 (1992), available 
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1192113.pdf?acceptTC=true (“Effective 
enforcement of securities laws requires that regulators be able to thwart the 
dissipation or secreting of the fruits of international securities fraud, and to 
facilitate the return of the illicit profits to injured investors.”). 
 158. Id.; David Chaikin, The Freezing of Criminal Assets, 8 COMMW. L. 
BULL. 1197, 1198 (1982) (discussing the illegal gains of general crimes). 
 159. See generally U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra 
note 139; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141. 
 160. About IOSCO: IOSCO Historical Background, IOSCO, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 
14, 2011) [hereinafter IOSCO Historical Background]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id.; see also Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 
98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 338 (2010). 
 163. IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 160. 
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tional cooperation in the context of securities regulation.164 In 
particular, IOSCO has promoted a Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding since 2002.165 The purpose of this MMOU is 
to “facilitate cross-border enforcement and exchange of infor-
mation among international securities regulators.”166 In recent 
years, a significant number of regulators have signed the 
IOSCO MMOU, 167  and they have frequently employed the 
MMOU mechanisms for their enforcement cooperation.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 164. See id.; see also Brummer, supra note 162, at 338. 
 165. IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 160. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Currently, ninety-seven authorities are listed as signatories in Appen-
dix A of the MMOU. Current Signatories, supra note 26. 
 168. In 2003, fifty-six requests were filed under the MMOU; in 2004, 307 
requests; in 2005, 384 requests; in 2006, 526 requests; in 2007, 726 requests; 
in 2008, 867 requests; in 2009, 1261 requests; and in 2010, 1624 requests 
were filed. IOSCO Library Section: Multilateral Memorandum of Under-
standing Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of In-
formation (MMoU), IOSCO, 
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013). 
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ii. Scope of Assistance  
Article 7 of the IOSCO MMOU provides signatories with the 
ability to use its complete domestic power.169 A requested sig-
natory can thus choose from among three types of assistance to 
execute, depending on the request.170 First of all, if a requesting 
authority is seeking information in the possession of a request-
ed authority, the latter can comply under the MMOU by simply 
sending the information to the former.171 On the other hand, if 
a requesting authority is seeking information that a requested 
authority does not have, the latter can use its investigative 
power to obtain the documents and then send them to the for-
mer.172 Furthermore, in some instances, a requested authority 
can compel a particular person to make statements or give tes-
timony.173 
The MMOU also specifies types of information that can be 
shared.174 The ability to obtain key information is crucial to 
succeeding in securities investigations.175 Indeed, many author-
ities investigating securities fraud seek a broad range of infor-
mation regarding investments, brokerage, transactions, and 
management.176 Plenty of information can be obtained from en-
tities regulated by a requested authority,177 but certain infor-
mation is accessible only through unregulated entities.178 For 
example, an authority investigating market manipulation or 
insider trading usually requests bank records in order to track 
money involved in fraud.179 Thus, in order to successfully com-
bat market manipulation and insider trading, a requested au-
thority must secure the ability to demand from unregulated 
                                                                                                                                     
 169. IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(a). 
 170. See id. arts. 7(b), 9. 
 171. Id. arts. 7(b)(i), 9(a). 
 172. Id. arts. 7(b)(ii), 9(b). 
 173. Id. arts. 7(b)(iii), 9(c). 
 174. See id. art. 7(b)(ii). 
 175. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 15. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 15. 
 178. Id. at 16. 
 179. Id. 
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entities information that it can then deliver to a requesting au-
thority.180 
For this reason, the MMOU provides that an authority can 
share not only information obtained from a regulated entity, 
but also records received from an unregulated one, namely, a 
bank.181 Article 7 stipulates that signatory authorities can per-
form a mutual exchange of (1) “contemporaneous records suffi-
cient to reconstruct all securities and derivatives transactions, 
including records of all funds and assets transferred into and 
out of bank and brokerage accounts relating to these transac-
tions”;182 (2) “records that identify: the beneficial owner and 
controller, and for each transaction, the account holder; the 
amount purchased or sold; the time of the transaction; the price 
of the transaction; and the individual and the bank or broker 
and brokerage house that handled the transaction”;183 and (3) 
“information identifying persons who beneficially own or con-
trol non-natural [p]ersons organized in the jurisdiction of the 
[r]equested [a]uthority.”184 
Despite these provisions, authorities have in recent years 
sought a range of information broader than what the MMOU 
requires they share while investigating insider trading and 
market manipulation.185  In particular, authorities often find 
crucial evidence of insider trading from telephone conversa-
tions and Internet service history,186 which are not made avail-
able under any explicit provision of the IOSCO MMOU.187 
                                                                                                                                     
 180. Id. 
 181. See IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, arts. 7(b)(ii), 9(b). 
 182. Id. art. 7(b)(ii). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 16; see, e.g., United States 
v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499–500, 502, 507–12, 514–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (showing that telephone conversations, instant messages, and emails 
exchanged between defendants revealed that the defendants committed in-
sider trading). 
 186. See CARVAJAL & ELLIOTT, supra note 142, at 16; see, e.g., Rajaratnam, 
802 F. Supp. 2d at 499–500, 502, 507–12, 514–16. 
 187. See generally IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156, art. 7(b)(ii). 
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2. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) 
a. Overview 
Besides MOUs, two countries often enter into treaties regard-
ing mutual legal assistance in criminal proceedings.188 Such an 
agreement is called an MLAT.189 Though this treaty applies 
only in criminal cases, the SEC can nonetheless use it to “ob-
tain assistance in any investigation that relates to any securi-
ties violation that might be punishable by criminal sanc-
tions.”190 Thus, an MLAT can be a powerful tool for securities 
authorities to conduct international enforcement. 191  This is 
primarily because an MLAT contains its own binding power192 
and allows various types of assistance.193 In the United States, 
this treaty is usually maintained by the DOJ.194 As of 2011, the 
DOJ maintains MLATs with a number of foreign countries,195 
including Switzerland in 1973, Canada in 1985, the U.K. in 
                                                                                                                                     
 188. Lynda M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive on Insider Deal-
ing: A Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in 
International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 231 (1995); 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011, at 43, 55, 
161, 265, 294 (2011) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf. 
 189. Ruiz, supra note 188, at 231. 
 190. Mills et al., supra note 132, at 499; see also DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, 
SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3. 
 191. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 42. 
 192. See Paul Coggins & William A. Roberts, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
An Untamed Adolescent, 17 COMMW. L. BULL. 1391, 1402 (1991) (addressing 
the fact that MLATs legally oblige countries to provide assistance to each 
other); see also DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3 (“MLATs 
may be an effective mechanism to obtain assistance when an MOU with a 
particular country either does not exist or does not permit the type of infor-
mation sought from a witness residing overseas.”). 
 193. See John E. Harris, International Cooperation in Fighting Transna-
tional Organized Crime: Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition, in United Nations Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), Annual Report for 1999 and 
Resource Material Series No. 57, at 133, 139 (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no57/57-11.pdf  (listing the 
types of assistance that can be provided under MLATs). 
 194. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3. 
 195. Id.; see, e.g., TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 188, at 43, 55, 161, 265, 
294. 
2014] TRANSNAT'L HEDGE FUND FRAUD 255 
1994, Hong Kong in 1997, and South Korea in 1993.196 Thus, in 
order to obtain assistance from these countries under their 
MLATs, the SEC must ask the DOJ to assume the requesting 
process on its behalf.197 This MLAT process proves useful in 
cases where MOUs are not available.198 
b. Making Requests 
Most MLATs specify how to make a request for assistance.199 
MLATs do not usually allow securities authorities to make a 
request directly to their counterparts.200 Instead, they require 
authorities to communicate with each other through an official 
channel for administrating MLAT procedures, namely, a “Cen-
tral Authority.”201 Given this requirement, all requests and re-
sponses to requests must be made through each country’s re-
spective Central Authority on behalf of other regulatory au-
thorities in the country.202 
Indeed, MLATs signed by the United States with Switzer-
land, Canada, the U.K., Hong Kong, and South Korea all have 
provisions to appoint Central Authorities for each party.203 Un-
der these MLATs, in the United States, the Central Authority 
                                                                                                                                     
 196. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27; 
U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-S. Ko-
rea MLAT, supra note 27. 
 197. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can. 
MLAT, supra note 27, arts. I, VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, 
art. 2; U.S-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra 
note 27, art. 2. 
 198. DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC, supra note 27, § 3.3.6.3. 
 199. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-
H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2. 
 200. Beard, supra note 129, at 274. 
 201. Harris, supra note 193, at 140; see also U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 
27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 1; U.S.-
U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 3–4; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 
27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1, 3. 
 202. Beard, supra note 129, at 274; see also U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 
27, ch. VII, art. 28, paras. 1–2; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 
1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra 
note 27, art. 2, para. 3; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 1. 
 203. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1; U.S.-Can. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–
2; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, 
supra note 27, art. 2, paras. 1–2. 
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is the Attorney General or his designee;204 in Switzerland, the 
Division of Police of the Federal Department of Justice and Po-
lice in Bern;205 in Canada, the Minister of Justice or his design-
ee;206 in the U.K., the Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment or his designee;207 in Hong Kong, the Attorney General of 
Hong Kong or his designee;208 and in Korea, the Minister of 
Justice or his designee.209 
c. The Demands of Dual Criminality 
MLATs often require that a request demonstrate dual crimi-
nality.210 Under this requirement, a case specified in a request 
must constitute a crime in not only the requesting but also the 
requested jurisdiction.211 For example, the MLAT between the 
United States and Switzerland stipulates that each party can 
use its compulsory power for the purpose of assistance when 
“an offense . . . would be punishable under the law in the re-
quested [s]tate if committed within its jurisdiction and [it] is 
listed in the [s]chedule [of the treaty].”212 The MLATs signed by 
the United States with Hong Kong and South Korea also re-
quire that the request show dual criminality.213 Under each of 
these three MLATs, however, dual criminality is not demanded 
                                                                                                                                     
 204. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1; U.S.-Can. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; 
U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra 
note 27, art. 2, para. 2. 
 205. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1. 
 206. U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. I. 
 207. U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2. 
 208. U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2. 
 209. U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2. 
 210. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2; U.S.-H.K. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, 
art. 3, para. 1(d). 
 211. Harris, supra note 193, at 140. 
 212. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2. Under this 
MLAT, however, dual criminality is not demanded in cases where requests 
involve “offenses against the laws relating to bookmaking, lotteries and gam-
bling when conducted as a business.” Id. app. at 49. 
 213. U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d). 
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in cases where requests involve certain crimes listed in its An-
nex.214 
Arguably, discarding the dual criminality requirement would, 
in fact, promote better cooperation.215  Because each country 
defines securities law violations in different ways, a require-
ment of this sort can actually impede international coopera-
tion.216 Indeed, the MLATs signed by the United States with 
Canada and the U.K. have no provision of dual criminality.217 
Thus, assistance is available under these MLATs as long as a 
requested case is criminally liable in a requesting country.218 
III. REFORMING MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING TOWARD 
GREATER ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
A. Enhancing Mechanisms for Cooperation in Asset Freezing 
1. Ineffectiveness of Current Methods 
Assistance in freezing assets is indispensable to combatting 
international securities fraud because if violators cannot enjoy 
the proceeds of the frauds, the deterrent function of securities 
laws will increase. 219  Securities regulators, therefore, often 
seek to freeze assets abroad through cooperative mecha-
nisms. 220  Unfortunately, examining the methods that are 
available reveals that they are too lengthy and unstable for se-
                                                                                                                                     
 214. U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2(b); U.S.-H.K. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, annex; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 
3, annex. 
 215. See Beard, supra note 129, at 274 (explaining the MLAT between the 
U.S. and Switzerland). 
 216. See id.; PICKHOLZ, supra note 137, §§ 4:42, 4:45. 
 217. U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. II, para. 3; Warren Christopher, 
Letter of Submittal to Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-2, 1994 U.S.T. LEXIS 
205, at *4 (1995) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal]. 
 218. See U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. II, para. 3; Letter of Submit-
tal, supra note 217, at *4. 
 219. See Chaikin, supra note 158, at 1198 (discussing the illegal gains of 
general crimes); see also Mann et al., supra note 157, at 304; see also Ethi-
opas Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, SEC, IOSCO Annual Conference: 
Pub. Discussion Panel on Combating Fin. Crime Globally (Oct. 17, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101703iosco.htm [hereinafter IOSCO 
Annual Conference]. 
 220. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5. 
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curities enforcement and thus are not as effective as they 
should be.221 
For example, MLATs can be used to freeze assets abroad if a 
treaty has been arranged beforehand.222 This method, however, 
is not effective for securities enforcement because MLATs are 
designed for criminal prosecution and often require a request to 
demonstrate dual criminality.223 Furthermore, MLATs are gen-
erally administered by criminal authorities, such as the DOJ, 
and not by securities regulators.224 Indeed, most MLATs re-
quire that a request be processed through a Central Authority, 
which is designated in each MLAT.225 Generally, each country 
designates the Ministry of Justice or the Attorney General to 
carry out this position.226 For instance, in all MLATs to which 
the United States is a signatory, either the Attorney General, 
who serves as head of the DOJ,227 or his designee serves as the 
Central Authority;228 but using the Central Authority is not an 
effective process in international securities enforcement be-
cause securities regulators cannot directly make a request to 
foreign counterparts. 229  Such bureaucracy in the requesting 
process can also delay the execution of assistance. Indeed, in 
order to use MLATs to obtain information from a foreign secu-
rities agency, the SEC must ask the DOJ to make a request so 
that the DOJ may then forward the request to the designated 
                                                                                                                                     
 221. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 222. OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5; see also Mann et al., supra 
note 157, at 323–24. 
 223. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. I, art. 4, para. 2; U.S.-
H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra 
note 27, art. 3, para. 1(d); see Beard, supra note 129, at 273–74. 
 224. See Beard, supra note 129, at 273 & n.14, 274. 
 225. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27; U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra 
note 27, arts. I, VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-H.K. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2. 
 226. Harris, supra note 193, at 140. 
 227. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2006). 
 228. See, e.g., U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28, para. 1; 
U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 27, art. I; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 
2, para. 2; U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; U.S.-S. Korea 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, Title 9 
Criminal Resource Manual 276: Treaty Requests, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00276.h
tm. 
 229. Beard, supra note 129, at 274. 
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Central Authority of a foreign country rather than to the agen-
cy with the relevant expertise and knowledge. 230  In recent 
years, as securities law enforcement has increasingly required 
prompt action,231  this process has become particularly prob-
lematic. 
Securities regulators have another option besides using 
MLATs: namely, to bring a civil action in a foreign court and 
thereby seek to freeze illegal proceeds.232 This method suffers 
from its own difficulties. If the SEC opts to use this method, it 
may be exposed to risks of litigation, in addition to facing diffi-
cult situations wherein a foreign court may require the SEC to 
pay financial undertakings for the filing of injunctions.233 In-
deed, in SEC v. Lydia Capital,234 the SEC was faced with legal 
challenges that compelled it to pay financial undertakings.235 
2. Need for the MOU Approach 
To overcome the deficiencies in using the two methods men-
tioned above, securities regulators should enter into MOUs 
that require them to take all necessary steps to assist their for-
eign counterparts in obtaining asset freezes where the assets 
are located. 236  If securities regulators use MOUs instead of 
MLATs or civil actions, enforcement cooperation can be more 
effective, because securities regulators can directly communi-
cate with one another to freeze assets abroad.237 Indeed, when 
entering into these types of MOUs, authorities specializing in 
                                                                                                                                     
 230. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 27, ch. VII, art. 28; U.S.-Can. 
MLAT, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 1; U.S.-U.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; 
U.S.-H.K. MLAT, supra note 27, art. 2; U.S.-S. Korea MLAT, supra note 27, 
art. 2. 
 231. See Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 48. 
 232. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 233. Id. 
 234. SEC v. Lydia Capital, No. 07-10712-RGS, 2008 WL 509136 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 21, 2008). 
 235. SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund 
Principal, GIBSON DUNN (June 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/SECAssetFreezeInUKAgains
tHedgeFundPrincipal.aspx. 
 236. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 326 (arguing that the MOU would 
be a useful tool for “enforcing provisional orders and final judgments”); see 
also Friedman et al., supra note 21, at 50 (calling for international assistance 
in freezing assets). 
 237. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (illustrating Canadian 
experience in cross-border asset-freezing assistance). 
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securities laws can directly negotiate and administer agree-
ments so as to close the differences in securities enforcement 
regimes. 238  In addition, by directly communicating under 
MOUs, securities regulators can more quickly help freeze as-
sets than they can under MLATs, which require an indirect 
and bureaucratic process. 239  Even so, MOUs signed by the 
United States with Canada, the U.K., and Hong Kong do not 
currently have explicit provisions to assist in freezing assets 
abroad.240 The IOSCO MMOU, likewise, does not require asset 
freezing assistance.241 Considering the benefits of direct coop-
eration, however, MOUs, including the IOSCO MMOU, should 
incorporate asset freezing assistance in some way.242 
3. Need for the Enhanced Domestic Authority of the U.S. SEC 
The scope of “asset freezing assistance” can be broad, from 
non-substantive assistance—for example, merely explaining 
the asset-freezing process243—to substantive assistance—such 
as obtaining asset freezes on behalf of a foreign authority.244 
Complicating matters, many securities regulators cannot cur-
rently provide substantive assistance to their foreign counter-
parts.245 Indeed, most securities regulators may only be able to 
provide information about the domestic legal framework—as 
was the case when the U.K. Financial Services Authority 
(“U.K. FSA” or “FSA”) provided it to the SEC in Lydia Capi-
                                                                                                                                     
 238. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 327. 
 239. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (addressing efficiency 
in asset-freezing assistance provided by Canadian regulators); see also Mann 
et al., supra note 157, at 326–27. 
 240. See generally U.S.-U.K. MOU, supra note 140; U.S.-Can. MOU, supra 
note 139; U.S.-H.K. MOU, supra note 141. 
 241. See generally IOSCO MMOU, supra note 156. 
 242. See Mann et al., supra note 157, at 327–28 (discussing that a possible 
MOU without asset-freezing assistance thwarts prosecution efforts to seize 
profits retained outside the United States, and describing how a potential 
MOU requiring asset-freezing assistance could operate). 
 243. See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, supra note 235 (describing how the U.K.’s FSA 
assisted the SEC in freezing assets in Lydia Capital). 
 244. See, e.g., IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 245. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N’S PRESIDENTS COMM., RESOLUTION ON 
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION TO FREEZE ASSETS DERIVED FROM SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES VIOLATIONS 1 ( June 7, 2006), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES25.pdf [hereinafter 
IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM.]; see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 
219. 
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tal246—or, at most, to provide information about other channels 
such as criminal authorities or private law firms. Thus, even if 
securities regulators change their MOUs to include asset freez-
ing assistance, the difficulties in freezing assets abroad will not 
necessarily be eliminated.247  This is primarily because most 
securities regulators, including the SEC, “still lack sufficient 
powers to freeze ill-gotten assets on behalf of a foreign regula-
tor.” 248  Because of this, the foreign regulator must work 
through criminal channels or private law firms to accomplish 
any asset freezing in the United States; however, these chan-
nels are either ineffective or risky, as discussed above.249 
For this reason, the U.S. Congress should consider authoriz-
ing the SEC to go to court in the name of foreign authorities to 
obtain asset freezes.250 Along with this authority of representa-
tion, the SEC can provide substantive assistance under MOUs, 
enhancing international cooperation accordingly.251 
Indeed, securities regulators have recognized the importance 
of the authority to seek asset freezes on behalf of foreign regu-
                                                                                                                                     
 246. In this case, the SEC requested the FSA to provide legal advice. 
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 235. This advice aided the SEC in understanding 
the English legal system. See id. The SEC then directly brought a civil action 
in the U.K. High Court, arguing that the assets should remain frozen. SEC 
Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund Manager, 
SEC Litigation Release No. 20585 (May 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20585.htm; Aaron Helm, U.S. 
SEC v. Manterfield: How Her Majesty’s Courts Assisted the SEC in the Fight 
Against Global Financial Fraud, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 524 (2010) 
(citing U.S. SEC v. Manterfield, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1349, Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 
477 (Eng.)). 
 247. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; see also IOSCO 
Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 248. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; IOSCO Annual 
Conference, supra note 219. 
 249. See Beard, supra note 129, at 273–74 (discussing the ineffectiveness of 
MLATs); see also IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (discussing 
problems in filing civil proceedings in a foreign country). For the details of 
this discussion, see supra Part III.A.1. 
 250. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.) (granting 
the Ontario Securities Commission the legal authority to temporarily freeze 
assets in Canada on behalf of foreign authorities). 
 251. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219 (calling for “increasing 
the abilities of securities regulators to freeze and repatriate assets on behalf 
of foreign counterparts”). 
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lators.252 In 1992, Michael D. Mann, who was the Director of 
the SEC Office of International Affairs, argued in an article 
that cooperation in enforcing provisional orders would benefit 
from MOU approaches,253 and that “the foreign authority, pur-
suant to both the MOU and domestic law, would petition its 
courts or proper authorities for relief on behalf of the SEC.”254 
In 2003, Ethiopis Tafara, the current Director of the SEC Office 
of International Affairs, also contended that “the next bold step 
for securities regulators in their fight against cross-border fi-
nancial crime . . . is increasing the ability of securities regula-
tors to freeze and repatriate assets on behalf of foreign coun-
terparts.”255 
As did the domestic regulators, IOSCO recognized in 2006 
that substantive assistance in freezing assets was crucial for 
effective cooperation in securities enforcement,256 and reported 
that “many jurisdictions still lack sufficient powers to freeze ill-
gotten assets on behalf of a foreign regulator.”257 IOSCO, there-
fore, encouraged “[a]ll member regulators . . . to examine the 
legal framework under which they operate and strive to devel-
op, through law reform or otherwise, mechanisms by which 
they or another authority within their jurisdiction could, on 
behalf of foreign regulator, freeze assets derived from suspect-
ed and established cross-border securities and derivatives vio-
lations.”258 
Furthermore, in 2008 the SEC entered into an enhanced en-
forcement MOU with the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (“ASIC”),259 which addressed the matters of freez-
ing assets abroad and restraining the distribution of illegal 
profits. 260  Specifically, this MOU provided that “[e]ach 
                                                                                                                                     
 252. See generally Mann et al., supra note 157; IOSCO Annual Conference, 
supra note 219. 
 253. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 326. 
 254. Id. at 328. 
 255. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 256. IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 2; see also TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 12 (Mar. 2007), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD239.pdf. 
 259. PICKHOLZ, supra note 137, § 4:7.50. 
 260. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information Related to the Enforcement of Securities 
Laws, U.S.-Austl., art. 3, Aug. 25, 2008, available at 
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[a]uthority . . . [confirm] its commitment to seek the legal au-
thority to assist the other [a]uthority in freezing assets in its 
jurisdiction that constitute proceeds of a possible violation of 
[l]aws and/or [r]egulations, and [to] facilitate restitution to in-
vestors.”261 Christopher Cox, who was Chairman of the SEC at 
that time, explained that under this enhanced enforcement 
MOU “the SEC and ASIC are . . . committed to seeking asset 
freezes on each other’s behalf, and to assisting with the restitu-
tion of funds to injured investors.”262 
Despite a series of efforts, however, the SEC still lacks the 
legal authority to obtain asset freezes on behalf of foreign au-
thorities.263 Indeed, the SEC cannot provide any substantive 
assistance in freezing assets even if MOUs are arranged.264 
This is primarily because the Exchange Act has no explicit pro-
vision authorizing the SEC to seek asset freezes on behalf of 
foreign regulators. In the context of information sharing, the 
SEC has the firm legal authority to obtain information on be-
half of foreign authorities, thus allowing it to substantively co-
operate with its foreign counterparts under MOUs. 265  Until 
1988, however, the SEC had not been able to use its investiga-
tive power to assist foreign authorities266 because “§ 21(a) of the 
Exchange Act, in its original version, limited the SEC’s ability 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_mututal_recognition/australia/enhan
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 262. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the International En-
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BUT OBSTACLES REMAIN 48 (1992),  available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/152094.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Many 
securities regulators lack this power. IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 
219. 
 264. See GAO REPORT, supra note 263, at 48; see also IOSCO Annual Con-
ference, supra note 219. 
 265. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 319–20; see also Securities and Ex-
change Commission Historical Society Interview with Ethiopis Tafara Con-
ducted on April 19, 2006 by Wayne Carroll, at 2, available at 
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/oral-
histories/tafara041906Transcript.pdf. 
 266. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 318–19. 
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to investigate violations of ‘this Title.’”267 In order to solve this 
problem, Congress added Section 21(a)(2) to the Exchange Act, 
thereby authorizing the SEC to conduct investigations for the 
purpose of gathering evidence and information for foreign secu-
rities regulators.268 In the context of asset freezing assistance, 
however, the Exchange Act does not yet provide the SEC with 
explicit legal authority to act on behalf of foreign authorities.269 
The ability to obtain a court order to freeze assets on behalf of 
foreign regulators will enable the SEC to provide substantive 
assistance in freezing assets, thereby enhancing international 
cooperation.270 
For example, the Ontario Securities Act of Canada grants the 
Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) the legal authority to 
temporarily freeze assets in Canada on behalf of foreign au-
thorities. 271  Foreign securities regulators can thus take ad-
vantage of this representing authority in Canada by requesting 
the OSC to exercise its power to freeze assets on a temporary 
basis.272 Therefore, cross-border securities enforcement will be 
far more effective if all other securities regulators also obtain 
the power to obtain asset freezes on behalf of their foreign 
counterparts.273 
The U.S. Congress, therefore, ought to consider passing legis-
lation that gives the SEC power to seek asset freezes in a U.S. 
court in the name of foreign regulators.274 These regulators can 
then take advantage of this authority by requesting the SEC to 
exercise it.275 Furthermore, such legislation can encourage oth-
er countries to adopt similar provisions.276 If the SEC and for-
eign securities regulators have the legal authority to obtain as-
                                                                                                                                     
 267. Id. at 319 n.68; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 48 
Stat. 899. 
 268. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2006); see also Friedman et al., supra note 
21, at 40; Mann et al., supra note 157, at 319. 
 269. See GAO REPORT, supra note 263, at 48; see also IOSCO Annual Con-
ference, supra note 219. 
 270. See IOSCO PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1; see also IOSCO 
Annual Conference, supra note 219. 
 271. Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.). 
 272. OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5. 
 273. See IOSCO Annual Conference, supra note 219; see also IOSCO 
PRESIDENTS COMM., supra note 245, at 1. 
 274. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 2011, c. S.5, § 126(1)(b) (Can.). 
 275. See OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 5. 
 276. Mann et al., supra note 157, at 329. 
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set freezes on each other’s behalf, they can then maximize the 
benefits of MOUs providing for asset freezing assistance.277 
B. Requiring Exchange of a Broader Range of Information 
To ensure more effective cooperation, the IOSCO MMOU 
needs to explicitly require signatories to obtain telephone or 
Internet records necessary for foreign counterparts’ investiga-
tions.278 The ability to obtain such information is crucial in suc-
cessfully combatting international insider trading, for tele-
phone records and Internet service histories often provide au-
thorities with crucial evidence of insider trading.279 Specifically, 
in United States v. Rajaratnam, telephone conversations, in-
stant messages, and emails exchanged between Raj Raja-
ratnam and other defendants showed that he obtained inside 
information from various sources, and either disclosed that in-
formation as a tip, or traded stock based on it.280 Thus, many 
authorities have recently sought a range of information broader 
than what the MMOU allows, particularly when these authori-
ties are investigating insider trading.281 
Despite the need for a broader range of information, there is 
no explicit provision of the MMOU that allows securities regu-
lators to seek telephone and Internet records from foreign au-
thorities.282 This limitation of the MMOU may impede effective 
enforcement cooperation among signatories, inasmuch as they 
would have to seek the same information through other mech-
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anisms. One such option for obtaining telephone and Internet 
records is to use a bilateral MOU that has been arranged be-
tween regulators.283 The bilateral MOUs, however, cannot cov-
er a broad range of jurisdictions.284 A second path to acquiring 
telephone and Internet information might be to use MLAT pro-
cedures,285 though these are limited to criminal cases.286 The 
last option for obtaining that information involves using infor-
mal channels;287 however, with respect to these informal meth-
ods, reliability and cooperativeness are often uncertain, making 
it difficult to anticipate whether the information is obtainable. 
For this reason, the IOSCO MMOU should contain an explicit 
provision requiring signatories to obtain telephone or Internet 
records for assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed international cooperation in securi-
ties enforcement, with particular emphasis placed on detecting, 
investigating, and prosecuting hedge fund fraud and market 
manipulation. It has revealed several concerns about current 
international enforcement systems for cross-border hedge fund 
fraud. A major concern is that the current MOUs have not been 
effective in combatting multinational hedge fund fraud. 288 
Thus, this article calls for revisions of the MOUs. Specifically, 
bilateral MOUs and the IOSCO MMOU should explicitly pro-
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vide assistance in freezing assets.289 The IOSCO MMOU should 
also be reformed by requiring that telephone records and In-
ternet service history be shared. 290  These recommendations 
would provide guidance for international enforcement systems 
in order to promote a more cooperative environment. 
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